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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
STUCK ON THE STARTING BLOCKS 
A RESPONSE TO MR STEVEN'S COMMENT ON THE 
SNP GENERAL ELECTION BUDGET 1997 
by Andrew J Wilson, Economist, Scottish National Party 
History has a habit of repeating itself with a dismal 
regularity. In 1970, Oxford University Press 
published a book edited by Professor Neil 
MacCormick1, this included two essays making an 
economic case for and against Independence. The 
authors were Professor KJW Alexander in the grey 
corner, and Professor David Simpson in the 
sunshine corner. The former was Professor of 
Economics at Strathclyde while the latter became 
the founder-director of the Fraser of Allander 
Institute. The same book published a reply to 
Simpson from Alexander and then a reply to 
Alexander's reply from Simpson. And so it was to 
continue. 
Even then the arguments being rehearsed in Mr 
Steven's piece in this journal found early expression 
in what Professor Alexander had to say. Then the 
economic case against independence was centred on 
the contention that Scotland would inherit a fiscal 
deficit of some £100 million. 
In reality of course the inherited fiscal position is of 
less importance to the economics of independence 
than the dynamics. It is not the starting point but 
what happens through time that is of greater 
importance. If an independent government is better 
for the Scottish economy than London government, 
delivering faster growth and releasing any latent 
enterprise potential then any initial fiscal surplus 
would quickly diminish. Alternatively if we in 
Scotland are innately incapable of sound 
government then the existence of an inherited 
surplus would quickly disappear, transforming into 
a deficit. It is therefore far more informative to 
analyse the dynamics of the economics of 
independence. 
The SNP have begun that process, firstly by 
commissioning an initial study into the impact of 
the relocation of the centre of power to Edinburgh. 
The results of this were not included in the SNP 
Budget but if they were they would add 
significantly to the credit side of the economic case. 
The next stage was the construction of a 'budget' for 
the first term of an independent Parliament This 
took the existing Government expenditure and 
revenue plans as its starting point and altered these 
in line with differing policy objectives. However, 
since the late 1960s, the economic case against 
independence has remained largely stuck on the 
starting blocks. An economic analysis of the alleged 
inherited fiscal situation is, to proponents of the 
negative case all important. The key motivation is 
political. This argument attempts to foster a 
dependency culture in Scotland, to develop the idea 
that Scotland is dependent on London for its 
economic well-being. The long-term impact of 
preaching dependency has not been estimated but 
has probably had a negative effect on the dynamism 
of the Scottish economic agent. After all, why get 
up and go when someone else is doing it for you. 
It is very interesting in that light to note the words 
of Professor Sir Donald Mackay, who in his 
introduction to a book published in 19773, wrote: 
"Scots have many virtues, but constructive self-
criticism is not their strong point. This reflects a 
basic lack of confidence, which in the discussion of 
economic matters is revealed by two extreme 
viewpoints. The first, and historically the 
predominant, argument is that the Scottish economy 
is so weak and dependent on England that self-
government would result in serious economic 
disadvantage....[this argument]..at worst represents 
an unthinking conservatism, which can affect both 
wings of the political spectrum , and which appears 
to take little account of the political realignments of 
the post war period . 
Proponents of the economics of independence have 
therefore been left with the choice of focusing 
solely on the dynamic benefits and thereby being 
left with the unanswered conundrum of an alleged 
fiscal shortfall on the independence starting blocks, 
or taking the arguments of what Mackay calls 
'unthinking conservatism' head on. The SNP 
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decided some time ago, to attempt both. 
Mr Steven's' Contribution 
Mr Steven's paper, and his earlier letters to the 
Scottish press,6 provide a welcome focus on the 
SNP programme. However, the tone of the vast 
bulk of his article is curiously and extravagantly 
scornful - more polemic than analytical. People 
should of course be free to pursue a professional 
and political career simultaneously but in doing so 
should make clear which hat they are wearing at 
any one time. His main criticisms are also 
demonstrably unfounded. The key points made by 
Mr Steven's that I would like to address are as 
follows: 
The contention that the analysis of the 
'relative' fiscal position is unwarranted. 
The contention that the method used to 
estimate Scotland's future fiscal position is 
wrong. 
The contention that Mr Steven's method of 
estimation is more accurate. 
The contention that the economic windfall 
of North Sea oil would have been a burden 
on an independent Scottish economy. 
The contention that the growth 
assumptions in the SNP budget are 'a 
triumph of assertion over analysis'. 
The Politics of Scotland's Fiscal Position 
The debate on Scotland's fiscal position was re-
ignited in the lead up to the 1992 election by the 
publication of a document - Government 
Expenditure and Revenues in Scotland (GERS) -
which was intended to be used for political 
purposes. The proof of the motivation for the 
publication is to be found in a letter from the then 
Secretary of State, Ian Lang, to the Prime Minister 
dated 3 March 1992. The letter states: 
"/ am disappointed that both you and the 
Chancellor have reservations about publishing the 
booklet I have had prepared and printed setting 
out the details of the Government's expenditure and 
revenue in Scotland. I judge that it is just what is 
needed at present in our campaign to maintain the 
initiative and undermine the other parties. This 
initiative could score against all of them". 
This leaves no doubts about the motivation behind 
the publication of an analysis that could most 
generously be described as being at an early stage 
of development The publication of later versions in 
October 1995 and 1996 were more comprehensive 
although some of the methodology is questionable, 
but that debate is not central to the concerns of this 
paper and are detailed elsewhere.7 Of greater 
concern is that the results of that exercise were 
presented by Ministers as evidence that Scotland 
was subsidised by London. Mr Steven's contention 
that the detail of the analysis or the presentation of 
it would be unchanged regardless of the politicians 
in control reflects a surprising naivete about the 
nature and conduct of Government To allege that 
to suggest otherwise is a 'puerile slur' on the 
integrity of government officials is simply wrong.8 
Extending the logic of Mr Steven's argument would 
leave him in the position of having to present the 
same allegation to the current Prime Minister and 
other Cabinet Ministers. They after all have claimed 
consistently that Government unemployment 
statistics are "fiddled". The dispute in both instances 
is not with the Government officials but with the 
Ministers responsible. 
Extending the Official (GERS) Methodology 
Over Time 
The importance of the publication of the revised 
version of GERS in October 1996 is that it 
provided the starting point for the argument that 
Scotland contributed a £27 billion absolute surplus 
of revenue over expenditure to the London Treasury 
over the period from 1979 to 1995. The 
methodology used is therefore the official Scottish 
Office methodology. The SNP dispute the 
methodology but it was accepted as a starting point 
as this was the only way that the then Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury (William Waldegrave) 
would agree to answer any Parliamentary Question 
(PQ) on the issue. 
The October 1996 GERS publication found that 
Scotland's share of the UK fiscal deficit (General 
Government Borrowing Requirement - GGBR) in 
1994/95 was 17.1 per cent9 compared to a 
population share of 8.8 per cent. 
The PQ from Alex Salmond MP10 asked the Chief 
Secretary to apply this share to the published UK 
GGBR over the entire period in question. This was 
done but the percentage used was actually 17.9 per 
cent. This reflected a downward revision to the UK 
fiscal deficit (the denominator) for 1994/5. This 
revision was not (as should reasonably have been 
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done) applied to the corresponding Scottish figure, 
which after all is a constituent part of the UK 
figure. That this was not done is a quite 
extraordinary example of the ease with which 
'official' data can be misleadingly presented, 
although in this case the impact was marginal to the 
end argument. 
However, this did enable a profile of the Scottish 
GGBR to be estimated over a period for which 
there were largely no published official data for 
Scotland. To this was then added the Scottish share 
of privatisation proceeds and North Sea revenues, in 
line with Treasury convention. This stage is of 
course not disputed by Mr Stevens. This left an 
absolute surplus of revenue over expenditure over 
the period for Scotland of £27 billion (at 1996/7 
prices). 
The Relative Position and the UK Structural 
Deficit 
It is worth noting that this compared to a UK 
deficit, based on the GERS analysis, over the same 
period of just under £480 billion. Thus if Scotland 
was in no better or no worse a fiscal situation than 
the UK, on the basis of die GERS analysis, 
Scotland would have had a deficit over the period 
of £42 billion11. Thus the extent to which the 
Scottish public finances were relatively stronger is 
the difference between this figure and the actual 
surplus of £27 billion, producing a relative surplus 
of just under £70 billion. 
In other words, if Scotland had been independent in 
1979 and mirrored the fiscal policies of the UK 
(and crucially therefore the same borrowing profile) 
then at the end of the period the Scottish exchequer 
would be £70 billion better-off than if Scotland had 
a position precisely in line with the UK. The £27 
billion absolute surplus argument is therefore only 
the minimum statement of the strength of the 
Scottish position over that period. 
Far from Mr Steven's claims that this approach is 
unwarranted, there is thus no doubt that if one is 
assessing the fiscal position that Scotland would 
inherit on the starting blocks of independence, in 
order to judge whether it would be better or worse 
off, it is absolutely vital to examine the relative 
position. Interestingly this point was agreed on by 
The Economist newspaper's review of the issue in 
199612. 
In constructing the budget for the forthcoming 4 
financial years, the SNP took as the starting point, 
the current planned Government fiscal policy 
profile. Crucially this includes the planned 4 year 
profile of Scotland's share of the UK's planned 
borrowing (and therefore debt) position. For this 
reason it was necessary to examine the relative 
position. It is Mr Steven's derision of this approach 
that is therefore unwarranted. This approach after 
all is what Mr Stevens implies when he refers to an 
alleged Scottish 'structural' fiscal deficit compared 
to the UK. In doing so he confuses the definition of 
'structural' fiscal deficit with that of the relative 
position. This problem is sourced to the fact that no 
where does he define what a 'structural' fiscal 
deficit is. 
His implication that it occurs when one economy is 
in deficit when another is in surplus is not sensible. 
That being the case every country in Europe bar 
Luxembourg would arguably suffer a 'structural' 
fiscal deficit (by Mr Steven's approach) when 
compared to Luxembourg. A more reasonable 
starting point, adopted more conventionally, would 
be that a country has experienced a 'structural' fiscal 
deficit when it records a deficit through the full 
course of one or a number of economic cycles13. 
Moreover, this calculation should perhaps more 
usefully be performed excluding such items as debt 
interest payments and privatisation proceeds to 
examine the underlying fiscal structure. 
Given this, what is clear is that many European 
Union countries have been in a 'structural' fiscal 
deficit over the last decade and beyond. Indeed the 
UK was in consistent and massive 'structural' deficit 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s and remains so at 
present. Indeed in 15 of the 17 years analysed in 
the Treasury answer the UK is in deficit compared 
to 6 of 17 years in Scodand's case. 
The implications of the £27 billion absolute 
surplus 
That Mr Stevens now accepts the accuracy of a £27 
billion Scottish absolute surplus over the period 
stated is welcome14. However his subsequent 
conclusions are contradictory to his acceptance of 
its accuracy. 
Given the erratic behaviour of the Scottish share of 
the UK GGBR it is of course probable that in any 
one year the share will not be the same as the 17.9 
per cent that the Treasury applied to reach the £27 
billion conclusion. Indeed it is for this reason Mr 
Stevens and other politicians and commentators 
derided the accuracy of the figure in the early part 
of 1997. The assumption of a trend share of 17.9 
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per cent was variously described as, 'outrageous' 
(Michael Forsyth), 'ludicrous' (Andrew Neil), 
'heroic' (Henry McLeish) and 'flawed' (PIEDA). 
However, these quotes were made in advance of a 
second Treasury Parliamentary answer, recorded on 
the last day of the last Parliament.15 This asked the 
Treasury Chief Secretary to produce the actual 
Scottish share of the UK GGBR for each year from 
1979 to 1995 using the same methodology 
published in the official GERS analysis for 1994/95. 
Again it must be stressed that this is a disputed 
methodology. 
This found a share which did indeed vary from year 
to year, but in an inconsistent and indeed 
contradictory fashion. Table 1 illustrates the UK 
GGBR for each year and the Treasury estimate of 
the Scottish share (excluding North Sea revenues 
and privatisation proceeds). 
When the implied Scottish GGBR was then 
calculated it was clear that the £27 billion was if 
anything an underestimate of the strength of the 
Scottish position as the absolute surplus was - on 
Government assumptions - £31 billion. This is 
because while in four of the years in question (a 
minority) the actual share was higher than the trend 
share, mis was in each case a higher share of a 
smaller UK figure. These years therefore had a 
lower weighted effect on the trend result. 
The line of attack on the independence case was 
therefore forced to change although the tone 
remained extravagant and scornful. Those who had 
previously argued that die £27 billion was absurd 
because the application of a trend share of the UK 
deficit of 17.9 per cent was flawed were proved 
wrong by the second Treasury answer. However, 
these same people then poured the same scorn on 
the argument that, as it was proven correct about 
the past, would it not - in the absence of any other 
consistent evidence - be perfectly reasonable to 
assume that it might be a fair estimator of the 
future position. 
What is clear is that there is margin for error in all 
these official estimates. They vary radically and 
inconsistently. For example, as table 1 shows, the 
published Scottish share of the UK deficit of £48 
billion in 1994/95 was over 17 per cent. The 
published share of a £27 billion UK deficit in 
1981/82 was 12 per cent.16 This seems to directly 
contradict Mr Steven's' assertion that the Scottish 
share will consistently rise when the UK deficit 
falls. 
Testing Mr Steven's Method 
It is also possible to test Mr Steven's own method 
of estimating future Scottish GGBR by applying it 
over the period since 1979 for which official 
Treasury estimates of the Scottish GGBR were 
provided in the second parliamentary answer 
referred to above, the results of which (a £31 
billion Scottish absolute surplus), Mr Steven's fully 
accepts. 
Table 2 sets this out Mr Steven's method is to 
assume a Scottish share of UK revenue of 8.9 per 
cent and a share of UK expenditure of 10.25 per 
cent. 
Mr Steven's calculation is provided for each year in 
columns 2 and 4. To this Mr Steven's then adds the 
Scottish share of privatisation proceeds and North 
Sea revenues thus providing the Scottish GGBR. 
This is done in columns 6 and 7. Column 7 
therefore provides the estimate of Scottish GGBR 
in each year since 1979 on Mr Steven's 
methodology. Column 8 provides the actual GGBR 
as published in the Treasury answer noted above. 
This concludes a Scottish absolute surplus of £31 
billion over the period, compared to £10.6 billion 
using the Mr Steven's approach. Column 9 
provides the error in Mr Steven's method for each 
year. What is apparent is that Mr Steven's method 
consistently underestimates the strength of the 
Scottish position and this is proved using official 
data. 
The available empirical evidence therefore directly 
contradicts Mr Steven's' assertions. Mr Steven's 
claims that the SNP procedure is less satisfactory 
than his own is therefore proved quite dramatically 
wrong. 
What then is the most reasonable approach to take 
to estimating the future position? On the basis of 
published Treasury evidence die only approach that 
has been proved broadly correct over any 
substantial period is the approach the SNP took of 
applying the same trend share that was proved by 
the Treasury to be a more than reasonable estimator 
of the past. 
At worst this approach is subject to the vagaries of 
any estimator of public expenditure,17- at best it is 
the most reasonable assumption, substantiated by 
empirical evidence. What the approach certainly 
does not merit is the extravagant derision employed 
by Mr Stevens that is more suitable for die saloon 
bar than the lecture hall. 
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The Economic Implications of North Sea 
Revenues 
Mr Stevens alleges that the £27 billion surplus only 
arises because of high oil revenues in 3 years in the 
mid-1980s. This ignores the fact (noted above) that 
Scotland was in absolute surplus in 11 of the 17 
years in question (not 3 as he implies) or, that the 
UK was in deficit in 15 of the 17 years. 
Where he is correct is in noting that the oil 
revenues of the mid 1980s were exceptionally high. 
He notes that we will 'never see their likes again' 
which may be true but that is due more to the effect 
of the political stability of the Middle East on oil 
prices than Scottish oil production which remains 
healthy. Moreover, his analysis stresses the 
exceptionally low revenues of recent years while 
ignoring that Inland Revenue projections suggest 
that North Sea revenues will be substantially higher 
in coming years. Indeed in the 6 years to 2002 the 
Inland Revenue forecasts revenues of £22 billion 
compared to less than £10 billion in the 6 years 
preceding that period. Chart 1 illustrates the 
strength of North Sea revenues in the 4 years of 
concern for the SNP budget, in contrast to the years 
chosen for the GERS analysis. 
This is important. If, as the GERS analysis 
suggests, excluding North Sea revenues, Scotland 
has a trend share of the UK deficit of around 17 per 
cent, then North Sea revenues require to be 
sufficiently healthy to make up the balance They 
were over the period of 1979 to 1995 and are likely 
to be in the coming 5 years. Again it must be 
stressed that all of this is based on the official and 
disputed GERS analysis. 
The Burden of Plenty? 
Where it becomes impossible to find merit in Mr 
Steven's case is when he effectively argues that the 
windfall of North Sea oil would have been a burden 
on the economic well-being of an independent 
Scotland. The basis of this case is that it would 
have led to a soaring Scottish currency which 
would have rendered Scottish exports un-
competitive thereby reducing domestic output. 
Mr Steven's argument ignores of course that over 
the period Scottish exporters were subject to the 
vagaries of the capital flow (not trade flow) 
denominated value of Sterling. Moreover it ignores 
the obvious policy response to any 'petro-boost' to 
the value of the currency which would be 
significant reductions in interest rates which 
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themselves would boost Scottish investment 
providing a healthy environment for long term 
growth. Similarly an outflow of funds resulting 
from a rising currency could be managed by 
external investment that took advantage of the 
strength of the currency to purchase foreign assets 
which themselves could return a long-term income 
stream. It also ignores the spectacular impact of the 
£100 billion tax revenues to an economy the size of 
Scotland. 
The Empirical Evidence 
Again looking to empirical evidence rather than 
assertion, Europe's other oil fired economy Norway 
does not seemed to have suffered the economic 
hardship Mr Stevens suggests. Indeed, from a 
position of GNP per head that was virtually 
identical to the UK in 1979 Norway has moved to 
a position where its GNP per head was 22 per cent 
higher than the UK by 1994. 
Similarly, the experience of the Norwegian currency 
over the period directly refutes Mr Steven's 
assertions as Chart 2 illustrates. 
What is clear is that over the period while the two 
currencies follow broadly similar trends, it is 
Sterling that performs more erratically and is more 
liable to marked appreciation than the Krone. 
Moreover as noted above, over this period, the 
growth of the Norwegian economy has outpaced the 
UK by 22 per cent. 
Mr Steven's contention that the windfall of plenty 
from the North Sea would have been an economic 
burden can therefore be demonstrated to be 
analytically flawed and empirically disproved. 
Analysing the SNP Budget 
Mr Steven's main comment on the SNP programme 
itself is to assert that the estimated impact on 
Scottish growth is a 'triumph of assertion over 
analysis'. He then goes on to assert a 'neutral 
growth' scenario without providing any analytical 
substantiation beyond the statement that most 
economists are of the view that Scottish growth 
would be slower. He quotes only one (albeit highly 
respected) economist. Professor Anton Muscatelli. 
In contrast, 10 academics of similar stature 
including 6 professional economists and 2 economic 
historians expressed contrary views as recently as 
April 29 1997.18 
Had Mr Stevens attempted to model the growth 
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impact of the programme there is no question that 
such a fiscal boost would have produced substantial 
and positive economic impacts. The analysis that 
was commissioned by the SNP was undertaken by 
the Mackay Consultants model of the Scottish 
economy. The results produced by any model will 
of course vary but the direction should be broadly 
similar. In fact, the additional growth projected over 
the period was relatively modest at an average of 
0.4 percentage points above the rate projected 
without the implementation of the programme.19 
This modest yearly increase would provide 
substantial long term benefits however although 
these are not critical to the budget's viability. 
This brings us finally to the budget itself.20 Any 
examination of the detail of what is proposed would 
conclude that the programme allows a substantial 
margin for error in any of the estimates used. This 
is only prudent given the fact that the estimates are 
based on Government projections shown to be 
erratic in previous years. The additional expenditure 
averages £1.5 billion per year which is less than 40 
per cent of the value of North Sea revenues in the 
current financial year. The projected additional 
income at Government disposal from a range of 
sources, averages £2.7 billion per year. That is a 
margin for error of 80 per cent. The budget plans 
for the residual to be used to begin repayment of 
the inherited Scottish share of the UK national debt. 
SNP budget itself. More positively however a 
consensus has been reached about the strength of 
Scotland's past position. It is to be hoped that the 
debate can now move to more fruitful discussions 
about the future. As noted at the outset it is the 
question of the dynamics of the economics of 
independence and the policy options before 
Scotland that would be more constructive. 
As Scotland enters an exciting period in its political 
and economic development what is required is a 
considered and constructive academic contribution 
to the debates about Scotland's economic future. 
This discussion needs to get off the starting blocks 
and onto the more substantial issues about what sort 
of country Scodand must be to meet the economic 
challenges of the next century. We must put aside 
negative and partial analyses and consider questions 
such as why, 100 years ago, Scotland was the most 
successful and enterprising economy in the world; 
why it has been in consistent relative decline since 
and what can be done to reverse this position? 
Given the historical pedigree, Scotland's economists 
must surely have a tremendous contribution to 
make. 
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Table 1: Treasury Estimate of UK GGBR and 
Scottish S 
(£ billion) 
1996/7 
prices 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983*4 
1984*5 
1985*6 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988*9 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
199293 
1993/94 
1994/95 
Total 
hare Usina GERS Meth 
UK deficit excl 
privatis proceeds 
and North Sea Revs 
34.7 
38.9 
27.4 
30.1 
35.8 
40.1 
34.1 
22.3 
11.7 
-2.1 
0.0 
8.7 
26.1 
52.1 
57.2 
48.1 
465.3 
odoloav 
% 
Scottish 
Share 
15% 
17% 
12% 
17% 
15% 
13% 
14% 
21% 
50% 
no estimate 
no estimate 
57% 
22% 
17% 
17% 
17% 
Source: Hansard 21 March 1997, HMT Ref: 1657N 96/97 
Table 2: Test 
(£ billion) 
At 1996/7 
prices 
1979/80 
198081 
1981/82 
198283 
1983*4 
1984*5 
1985*6 
1986*7 
1987/88 
1988*9 
1989O0 
199091 
1991/92 
1992(93 
1993194 
1994/95 
ToUl 
"ma Mr Steven's Method Aaak 
col l 
Total revs 
less oil 
2033 
203.1 
213.8 
2173 
220.1 
223.0 
229.0 
2455 
257.1 
265.7 
270.4 
264.1 
253.9 
2435 
244.5 
260.4 
3814.7 
ist Published Oflicii 
col 2 
Scottish 
share at 8.9% 
18.1 
18.1 
19.0 
193 
19.6 
19.8 
20.4 
21.8 
22.9 
23.6 
24.1 
235 
22.6 
21.7 
21B 
232 
3395 
>l Evidence 
col 3 
Total expdt 
less privat. 
proceeds 
237.8 
242.0 
2453 
261.9 
256.0 
2632 
2632 
267.8 
268.8 
263.6 
270.3 
272.8 
280.0 
295.6 
301.7 
308.6 
4288.6 
col 4 
Scottish 
Share 
at 10.25% 
24.4 
24.8 
25.1 
253 
262 
27.0 
27.0 
27.4 
27.6 
27.0 
27.7 
28.0 
28.7 
30.3 
30.9 
31.6 
4395 
col 5 
Balance 
(4-2) 
63 
6.7 
6.1 
65 
6.7 
7.1 
6.6 
5.6 
4.7 
3.4 
3.6 
4.5 
6.1 
8.6 
92 
85 
100.1 
col 6 
Scottish 
NSRevs 
l p p » 
4.4 
63 
85 
9.1 
14.0 
18.6 
16.6 
73 
63 
4.7 
32 
3.1 
\a 
2.1 
1.7 
2.1 
110.7 
col 7 
Scottish 
GGBR on 
Steven's 
Method 
I S 
-0.1 
-2.3 
-2.6 
-7.4 
-11.5 
-10.0 
-1.7 
-2.1 
-1.3 
0.4 
1.4 
42 
6.6 
75 
6.4 
-10.6 
col 8 
Published 
Treasury 
Estimates 
-0.6 
-0.9 
-5.0 
-4.2 
-9.1 
-13.7 
-122 
-2.8 
-1.1 
-4.8 
-3.3 
1.9 
3.9 
65 
8.0 
6.1 
•31.0 
col 9 
Steven'a 
error 
25 
03 
2.7 
15 
1.7 
23 
22 
1.1 
-1.0 
35 
3.7 
05 
-0.3 
02 
0.6 
-0.3 
-203 
Source: House of Common* Lferary, Raf: 97/6/18EP/RJT. SNP Research Department 
Chartl 
Chart 1: North Sea Revenues 1991-2002 
Period of SNP Budget 
1993/94 1994/96 1995/96 
Source: Inland Revenue, Statistics and economics Division, 19 Dsc 1998 
chart 2 
1978=100 Chart 2: Index of Sterling and Norwegian Krone against Trade Weighted Bas 
1978-1995 
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